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INTRODUCTION

INCLUDED

IN THIS article are summaries of cases from the
past year that contain important learning points for aviation
lawyers.
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I.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

In re Air Crash Disaster over Makassar Strait, Sulawesi involved
cases filed in various courts and consolidated in the multi-district litigation (MDL) court in the Northern District of Illinois
on behalf of fifty-two passengers who perished in the January
2007 crash of Adam Air Flight 574, traveling between the Indonesian islands of Java and Sulawesi.' None of the decedents or
their representatives were U.S. citizens or residents. 2 The Indonesian government, which issued a report, investigated the accident.' Additionally, there was evidence to suggest that several of
the plaintiffs in the action executed general liability releases obtained by Adam Air, which "purport[ed] to absolve all potentially liable parties, including the [d]efendants in this
litigation."4 The defendants moved to dismiss the cases based
on forum non conveniens with conditions for re-filing in the
Indonesian courts.5
The defendants, manufacturers of the aircraft and its component parts, argued in their forum non conveniens motion that
Indonesia was an adequate and available forum and that the balance of private- and public-interests factors weighed in favor of
dismissal. 6 In support of their argument regarding availability,
the defendants agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Indonesian courts and also provided a declaration from an Indonesian law expert stating that an Indonesian court would accept
the defendants' consent.7 As to whether the Indonesian forum
was adequate, the defendants' Indonesian law expert opined
that the plaintiffs would have adequate remedies in Indonesia.,
To counter these arguments, the plaintiffs relied on several
news articles in support of the assertion that Indonesian courts
are corrupt. 9 The court, however, found that "[n]one of the
articles offer[ed] concrete proof of corruption."'"
I In re Air Crash Disaster over Makassar Strait, Sulawesi, No. 09-cv-3805, 2011
WL 91037, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2011).
2 Id. at *2.
3 Id. at *1.
4 Id. at *2.
5 Id. at *1-2.
6 See id. at *2-4.
7 Id. at *3-4.
8 Id. at *4.
9 Id.
10 Id.

2011]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: GENERAL

155

With regard to the balancing of private- and public-interest
factors-the principal test to determine convenience-the court
found that the location of witnesses and the ease of access to
proof in Indonesia, including evidence in Adam Air's possession, weighed in favor of dismissal.'1 Moreover, the court relied
Adam Air-a sigon the inability of the defendants to implead 12
analysis.
private-interests
the
in
nificant factor
For the public-interest factors supporting dismissal, the court
noted that the accident occurred during "an Indonesian domestic flight, operated by an Indonesian domestic air carrier, carrying predominantly Indonesian citizens."13 Additionally, the
court determined that Indonesian interests in air safety, under
the circumstances of the accident and the subsequent investigation, far outweighed any U.S. interest. 4 The likely application
of Indonesian law to the case was also cited as a factor favoring
dismissal.15 Finally, the court addressed the proper deference to
the foreign plaintiffs, concluding that this consideration is little
more than a "'tie breaker"' and that such deference should not
tip the balance in the plaintiffs' favor if dismissal results in the
cases proceeding in their home forum, as it did here.' 6
In re Air Crash over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009 involved the
consolidated cases before the MDL court in the Northern District of California arising out of the Air France Flight 447 crash,
which occurred during an international flight from Rio de
Janeiro to Paris.' 7 All 228 passengers and crew perished in the
accident.1 " Cases were filed on behalf of dozens of foreign decedents from a multitude of countries, including claims from the
survivors and relatives of two U.S. citizens onboard the flight. 9
The defendants included Air France, Airbus, and various component-part suppliers for the A330 aircraft, some of which were
domiciled in the United States. 20 The manufacturing defendants moved to dismiss all cases based on forum non conveniens,
11 Id. at *6.
12 Id.
13

Id. at *8.

14 See id.
15 Id.
16 Id.

at *9 (citation omitted).
17 In reAir Crash over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, No. 10-2144-CRB, 2010
WL 3910354, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010).
18 Id.

19 Id. at *1 n.1.
20

Id. at *8 n.9.
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with conditions for re-filing in France. 21 In a separate motion,
Air France argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the
claims brought on behalf of the two U.S. citizen passengers
under the Montreal Convention's "fifth jurisdiction" provision
because the principal and permanent residence of the decedents was Brazil and not the United States.22 In the alternative,
Air France moved to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds.
The court did not accept Air France's "fifth jurisdiction" argument under the Montreal Convention and proceeded to consider the merits of the forum non conveniens dismissal to
France, which all defendants endorsed. 24 The court rejected
the argument of the U.S. plaintiffs that the creation of the "fifth
jurisdiction" in the Montreal Convention precluded dismissal of
cases filed on behalf of U.S. citizens pursuant to the terms of the
Convention. 25 Relying on the decisions from the West Caribbean Airways litigation,26 which addressed a similar argument
under the Convention, the court found that a forum non conveniens dismissal is not precluded in a Montreal Convention
"fifth jurisdiction" case.2 7 Thus, finding no bar to dismiss the
Montreal Convention case, the court proceeded to analyze the
merits of dismissal based on the well-defined body of forum non
conveniens case law from prior foreign aviation-accident cases.28
The plaintiffs advanced the argument that France was not an
adequate forum due to the seemingly slow pace of litigation in
similar aviation-disaster cases, which previously languished in
the courts of France for many years. 29 The plaintiffs did not
claim that jurisdiction over the defendants could not be had in
France or that French law did not provide them with an adequate remedy.30 The court, therefore, quickly concluded that
France was an adequate and available forum, notwithstanding
the plaintiffs' claim of delay. 1
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, 4.
23 Id. at *1.
24 Id. at *4.
25 Id. at *5.
26 In reW. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007), affd
sub nom. Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009).
27 In re Air Crash over Mid-Atlantic, 2010 WL 3910354, at *5-6.
28 See id. at *6-10.
- Id. at *7.
3o Id.
31 Id.
21
22
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Turning to the balancing of private- and public-interest factors, the plaintiffs' argument regarding the location of evidence
in the United States relating to the U.S. defendants' potential
liability did not persuade the court.12 Critical to its determination that the ease of access to proof in France tipped the balance in favor of dismissal was that the accident involved a
French airline, a French-manufactured aircraft, an investigation
led by the French authorities, and a likelihood that all cases
would be consolidated into a single proceeding in France. For
the public-interest analysis, the court found that France was
more interested than the United States.34 The U.S. interest in
ensuring the quality of component parts on aircraft in general
did not rise to the level of the French interest clearly demonstrated by the significance of the French-led investigation. 35 Additionally, the court found that "dismissal

.

. .

avoids the

prospect of courts in the United States having to apply French
law."'36 And finally, the court found it inappropriate to impose
the burden of several trials on the federal judiciary and potential jurors.3 ' The court granted the forum non conveniens
motion.3
In Patricia v. Boeing Co., the federal district court in Illinois
dismissed cases filed on behalf of foreign plaintiffs arising out of
the 2007 crash of Kenya Airways Flight 507 in Douala, Cameroon.3 9 The defendants argued that Cameroon was an available
forum because jurisdiction lies there and, in any event, the defendants consented to jurisdiction for any re-filed actions.4 ° In
addition, the defendants asserted that Cameroon courts provide
a remedy for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and
wrongful death claims.4 '
The plaintiffs countered the defendants' argument regarding
availability and adequacy by asserting that pretrial discovery is
unavailable in Cameroon and there was no remedy for their spo32

See id. at *8-9.

33 Id.
34 Id. at *9.
35 See id.
36

Id. at *10.

37 Id.

Id. at *11.
Patricia v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 3728, 2010 WL 3861077, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2010).
40 Id. at *2.
41 Id. at *3.
38
39

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE

[76

liation of evidence claim.42 The district court found the plaintiffs' arguments unpersuasive, pointing to the established body
of forum non conveniens case law that holds the absence of
U.S.-style discovery does not render a forum inadequate.4"
Moreover, because "[p]laintiffs are not entitled to identical
causes of action in the alternative forum," the unavailability of a
spoliation of evidence claim in Cameroon did not make its
courts inadequate.44
The district court's consideration of the private-interest factors contained the usual exposition found in foreign-accident
cases involving U.S. manufacturers-the location of liability and
damages evidence, the authority charged with the investigation,
and the location of the wreckage.45 Additionally, the district
court confirmed, as many other courts have, that courts entitle
foreign plaintiffs less deference in their choice of forum.46 Importantly, the district court noted that Kenya Airways, an indispensable party, was not subject to the court's jurisdiction and,
therefore, could not be joined if the lawsuits proceeded in the
United States.47 In Cameroon, however, Kenya Airways could be
joined, and thus, the district court found this to be a critical
private-interest factor weighing in favor of dismissal.4 ' For the
public-interest balancing, the district court found Cameroon's
interests predominated because U.S. interests diminish in a foreign-accident case involving a foreign airline resulting in the
deaths of foreign individuals. 49 Finally, the district court conducted a truncated choice of law analysis to demonstrate that
Cameroon law was likely to apply if the cases remained in the
United States-yet another factor favoring dismissal.50
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.P.A., the Third Circuit reviewed a Pennsylvania district court decision to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds a declaratory relief action filed
against the Italian metals manufacturer Chimet regarding the
stolen shipment of 100 kilograms of pure platinum in the course
of international transportation from Italy to the United States. 5 '
42

Id. at *2-3.

43 See id. at
44 Id. at *3.
45 Id.

*2.

Id. at *4.
Id.
48 See id.
49 Id. at *5.
50 Id. at *6.
46
47

51

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.P.A., 619 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Delta sought a declaration that the cargo limits set forth in the
Montreal Convention limited its liability.52 The dispute centered on the meaning of the shipment's air waybill, the standard
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) cargo
form, and a consignment agreement.5 3 The principal arguments advanced by Chimet in support of dismissal included the
convenience to Italian witnesses required to interpret the Italian
language documents at issue and the likelihood that Italian parties beyond the court's jurisdiction would need to be joined in
the litigation. 4 On this record, the Third Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of Delta's claims to Italy.5 5 Moreover, Delta's argument that the district court failed to give deference to Delta's
chosen forum under prevailing forum non conveniens jurisprudence did not persuade the Third Circuit. 56 It rejected this argument, finding that the deference to the plaintiffs choice of
forum must be balanced against the inconvenience to the defendant, and in this case, the inconvenience to Chimet if forced to
litigate outside of Italy overcame Delta's choice to sue in the
United States.5 7
In Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the district court in New York
sua sponte issued an order to show cause for why the court
should not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds an action
brought by a Canadian citizen.5" The case involved claims
under the Montreal Convention by a Delta passenger injured
when he fell on his way to the baggage area.5 9 The plaintiff alleged that Delta failed to provide the wheelchair he requested
during ticketing. 6° During two status conferences regarding the
parties' ability to marshal evidence for U.S. proceedings, the district court became concerned because most of the witnesses and
the plaintiffs treating physicians were located in Canada.6 1
Thus, the order to show cause followed.
The district court first addressed whether a forum non conveniens dismissal was permitted in an action brought under the
52

Id.

53 Id. at 292.
54 Id. at 294.
55 See id. at 301.

See id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
58 Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2080(BMC), 2010 WL 3210717, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010).
56

57

59 Id.
6 Id.
61 See

id. at *1.
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Montreal Convention. 62 The district court concluded that dismissal was permitted because a court may employ its own procedural rules in a Montreal Convention case, which includes the
doctrine of forum non conveniens .63 As to the deference afforded to the Canadian plaintiffs choice of forum, the court
afforded less deference to the plaintiff because, "when a foreign
plaintiff chooses a U.S. forum, it 'is much less reasonable' to
presume that the choice was made for convenience" and more
plausible to assume that the choice "'was made for forum-shopping reasons.'- 64 In balancing the convenience of the parties
and the private- and public-interest factors, the court concluded
that New York was not the center of the case.6 5 Witnesses and
evidence were readily accessible in Canada, and the facts occurring in New York were not seriously in dispute. 66 Finally, the
court found the Canadian forum "'significantly preferable'" to
the New York forum and dismissed the case.6 y
In Can v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Controls Systems, Inc., Turkish citizens filed suit in Connecticut district court against RollsRoyce and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems (GPECS)
for damages arising from a helicopter crash in Antalya, Turkey. 68 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that a prior Indiana state court dismissal of an almost identical
lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds should be given
preclusive effect. 69 In addition, the defendants made a substantive forum non conveniens motion, urging dismissal of the Connecticut lawsuit.7 0 In a lengthy exposition of the issuepreclusion doctrine under applicable law, the district court concluded that the Indiana dismissal should be given preclusive ef7
fect and dismissed the suit on that basis. 1
In addition, the court addressed the substantive arguments renewed before it regarding forum non conveniens. 72 The plaintiffs did not dispute that Turkish courts provided an available
62

Id. at *2.

63 Id.

- Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
65 Id. at *4-7.

6 Id. at *5, *7.
67 Id. at *10.
- Can v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Controls Sys., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 241,
245 (D. Conn. 2010).
69 Id. at 245.
70 Id. at 245-46.
71 Id. at 257.
72 Id.
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and adequate forum.73 Thus, the court easily determined dismissal to Turkey would be appropriate if the balance of privateand public-interest factors, when juxtaposed with the proper
deference afforded to the plaintiffs, weighed in favor of dismissal.7" In its analysis of the balancing factors, the court noted that
the foreign plaintiffs were entitled to little, if any, deference to
their choice of forum.7 5 Moreover, the scales tipped in favor of
dismissal because all of the plaintiffs' decedents were citizens of
Turkey, the witnesses to the accident were in Turkey, and a substantial amount of evidence was located in Turkey. 76 Finally, the
court pointed out that "'[c]ourts have repeatedly exercised
their discretion to hold that a defendant's manufacturing activities within the U.S. do not tilt the public interest in favor of
retaining jurisdiction.' ,77

In Sabatino v. Boeing Co., the Illinois state court in Cook
County denied the defendants' forum non conveniens motion
in a case brought by United Kingdom residents involving exposure to toxic fumes, which allegedly caused respiratory problems
during a charter flight from London to Orlando, Florida.78 The
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers of the aircraft's bleedair system, the aircraft, and its engines were at fault based on
theories of strict liability and negligent design.7 9 The defendants moved to dismiss the case for re-filing in the United Kingdom based on forum non conveniens, arguing that Illinois had
no significant connection to the case. 80 Although the court afforded the foreign plaintiffs less deference in its analysis, it held
nonetheless that the convenience factors did not favor one forum over the other."' Because evidence was located in multiple
forums, the court concluded that, as a practical matter, ease of
access to proof was not significant when the availability of documentary evidence is made easier in the age of the Internet, email, and other forms of telecommunication.8 2 The court
seemed to ignore its inability to compel unwilling witnesses for
73 Id. at 258.
74

See id. at 258-62.

75 Id. at 259.
76 See id.

Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
Cir. Ct., Cook Cnty.,
Sabatino v. Boeing Co., No. 09 L 1056, slip op., at 1 (Ill.
May 3, 2010).
77
78

79 Id.
80 Id. at 1-2.
81 Id. at 5.
82

Id. at 6.
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trial, concluding that the private-interest factors did not compel
the court to dismiss.8 3 Regarding public-interest factors, the
court found that Illinois had just as much of an interest as the
United Kingdom in the safety of aircraft, especially when the
defendants conduct business in Illinois and take advantage of
Illinois law.84

In Arik v. Boeing Co., foreign plaintiffs filed suit in Cook
County, Illinois, state court against the aircraft manufacturer
and the manufacturer of the ground-proximity warning system
following the 2007 crash of Atlasjet Flight 4203 near Keqiborlu,
Turkey.85 The plaintiffs, who were representatives of thirty-two
decedents, alleged causes of action based on product liability,
wrongful death, and negligence.8 6 The defendants moved for
forum non conveniens dismissal to Turkey, or in the alternative,
to the State of Washington, where the aircraft manufacturer's
main base for commercial-airplane manufacturing was located. 7
The Cook County court found that Turkey was an available
and adequate forum, noting that the defendants consented to
jurisdiction there.88 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the requirement of Turkish courts of a hefty filing fee and
the unavailability of U.S.-style discovery in Turkey rendered the
forum unavailable.8 9 When balancing the private- and publicinterest factors, however, the court pointed out that witnesses
and evidence were scattered among various countries and states,
making no singular forum more convenient.90 As a result, the
court found that the private-interest factors did not strongly
favor dismissal.9" Regarding the public-interest factors, the
court pointed out that Illinois was the headquarters of one the
defendants, where it enjoyed the protection of Illinois law; thus,
it was not appropriate to dismiss the case for re-filing in Turkey. 92 Moreover, while Washington was an available forum, the
defendants did not establish that Washington had a greater interest in the case than Illinois or that evidence could be more
See id.
- Id. at 7.
85 Arik v. Boeing Co., No. 08 L 012539, slip op., at 1 (I1. Cir. Ct., Cook Cnty.,
Feb. 18, 2010).
86 Id. at 1.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2.
83

89 Id.

Id. at 4-5.
9' Id. at 5.
92 Id. at 5-6.
9
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readily obtained in that forum.93 The court, therefore, denied
94
the defendants' forum non conveniens motion.
In Lleras v. ExcelAire Services, Inc., the Second Circuit reviewed
the forum non conveniens dismissal by the MDL court in the
Eastern District of New York of the cases arising out of the Gol
Flight 1907 mid-air collision over the Amazon rainforest.95 The
MDL involved over 100 cases filed on behalf of Brazilian plaintiffs against U.S.-domiciled defendants. 96 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the MDL court, finding that the foreign
plaintiffs were not entitled to deference in their choice of forum
and that Brazil was a "'significantly preferable"' forum to hear
the cases arising out of the accident due to the U.S. courts' lack
ofjurisdiction over potentially liable parties and the lack of com97
pulsory process over witnesses and evidence located in Brazil.
Thus, the Second Circuit found, on balance, the U.S. forum to
be "genuinely inconvenient" as compared to Brazil, further concluding that the balance of public- and private-interest factors
favored dismissal.9 Finally, the Second Circuit found no error
in the MDL court's determination that Brazil was an available
and adequate forum.9 9
II.

PREEMPTION

In US Airways, Inc. v. 0 Donnell, the Tenth Circuit considered
the preemptive scope of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(FAAct) as it applied to a New Mexico law that regulated the
service of alcoholic beverages onboard commercial flights.1"'
After a high-profile incident involving an intoxicated US Airways
passenger who was killed along with five others in an automobile
accident on his drive home from the Albuquerque airport, the
New Mexico Alcohol and Gaming Division (AGD) "served U.S.
Airways with a citation asserting that U.S. Airways had served alcohol to an intoxicated person."10 1 Further, the AGD "served
[US] Airways with a cease-and-desist order directing [US] Air93 Id. at 6-7.
94 Id. at 7.
95 Lleras v. ExcelAire Servs., Inc., 354 F. App'x 585, 586-87 (2d Cir. 2009).
96 In re Air Crash Near Peixoto De Azeveda, Brazil, on Sept. 29, 2006, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 272, 275-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
97 L/eras, 354 F. App'x at 587 (citation omitted).
98 Id.

99 Id.

100 US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 2010).

lo Id. at 1322-23.
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ways 'to refrain from ..

[
[76

serving ... alcoholic beverages"' on its

flights in New Mexico without a license.1"2 US Airways promptly
applied for a "license to serve alcoholic beverages to passengers
on aircraft in New Mexico."' 3 The AGD issued a 90-day temporary license to US Airways, but the AGD subsequently declined
to grant US Airways a permanent license, claiming US Airways
did not comply with the required New Mexico alcohol-server
training and cited the prior incident involving the US Airways
passenger as an additional basis for denial.'0 4
US Airways filed suit against the AGD in district court in New
Mexico, asserting that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA) and the FAAct preempted New Mexico's regulation of
the service of alcoholic beverages on US Airways flights.105 Both
sides moved for summary judgment in the district court on the
issue of preemption. 106 The AGD prevailed on its motion, with
the district court finding that the ADA and FAAct did not preempt New Mexico's regulation of the service of alcoholic beverages on commercial flights. 1 7 An appeal to the Tenth Circuit
followed.
"On appeal, [US] Airways reassert[ed] its contention that federal law both expressly and impliedly preempts [New Mexico] 's
regulation of an airline's alcoholic beverage service provided on
aircraft" under the ADA and FAAct, respectively. 108 The court
only addressed the issues of implied field preemption under the
FAAct because the outcome on this question did not require an
examination of whether the regulation was expressly preempted
under the ADA. 10 9 The court did find the New Mexico regulation preempted under the FAAct in a lengthy, well-reasoned
opinion that seemed to abandon the Tenth Circuit's prior decision in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., which found that the
FAAct did not preempt the entire field of aviation safety." 0 Recognizing that the Tenth Circuit was in the minority of circuits
on the issue of implied field preemption under the FAAct, the
court fashioned its opinion to be in line with other circuits find102 Id.
103 Id.
104

at 1323.

Id.

105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.

at 1323-24.
108 Id. at 1324.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1322; see Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th
Cir. 1993).
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ing that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of aviation
safety.'1 1 The court closely reviewed the various federal-aviation
regulations regarding the service of alcoholic beverages
onboard aircraft and found that such regulations left no room
for additional state regulation.1 2 Moreover, the court found
that the federal regulations addressing the service of alcoholic
beverages on aircraft related to aviation safety and were pervasive.1 13 Thus, the court held that federal law preempted New
Mexico's attempt to impose licensing requirements and additional training on airlines, such as US Airways." 4
In Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., the Third Circuit addressed whether federal law preempted the claims brought by a
disabled passenger injured when he fell down the airstairs of a
commuter aircraft. 11 5 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that federal law, here the Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA),116 provided the standard of care in the case and preempted the plaintiffs state law negligence claims." 7 Because
the ACAA requires that a passenger request assistance and the
plaintiff had not done so, the defendant could not be held liable to the plaintiff under this federal standard of care." 8 The
district court concluded that under the Third Circuit case Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc." 9 federal law indeed preempts state
law standards of care, and, due to the plaintiffs inability to show
that the defendants violated any federal standard in the ACAA,
the court granted summary judgment in the defendant's
favor. 120
On appeal, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its reasoning in
Abdullah that federal law impliedly preempts the entire field of
aviation safety, thus supplying the standard of care in cases that
seek to hold a defendant liable for aviation-safety related
claims.12 ' However, the court clarified that this preemption
only extends to in-flight safety, and because the plaintiff's injuries occurred during the disembarkation process, the court
111 US Airways, Inc., 627 F.3d at 1326-27.
112

Id. at 1325-26.

113 Id. at 1327-28.
114

Id. at 1328-29.

115 Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2010).
116
117

Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2006).
Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 123.

118 Id.

119 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
120 Elassaad,613 F.3d at 123-24.
121 Id. at 125.
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could apply state law standards. 122 The court vacated the decision of the district court
and remanded to the trial court for
1 23
further proceedings.

In Sikkelee v. PrecisionAirmotive Corp., a case arising from a 2005
crash of a Cessna aircraft manufactured in 1976, the plaintiff
brought multiple Pennsylvania state law claims against the defendants. 124 The defendants argued that federal law preempted
the plaintiffs claims because federal-aviation regulations provide uniform and exclusive standards for the entire field of aviation safety. 1 25 A plaintiffs "claims must consequently allege
violations of federal standards of care.' 1 26 Since the Sikkelee

plaintiff asserted state law standards of care, the defendants argued that those claims must necessarily be dismissed. 27 The
plaintiff argued that the Third Circuit's Abdullah decision had
been "overruled by the Supreme Court's preemption decision in
Wyeth v. Levine."128 Citing multiple statutes and cases, the court
held that Abdullah is still applicable post-Wyeth. 29 Thus, the
court dismissed all claims
asserted by the plaintiff under state
1 30
law standards of care.

Specifically discussing the General Aviation Revitalization Act
(GARA), the court recognized that "some courts found that
GARA's legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended
not to preempt the entire field of aviation safety."'' Furthermore, "some scholars observed that, until the commencement
of the statute of repose, state products-liability standards control
actions regarding the design or defects of general-aviation aircraft and component parts."13 2 Nevertheless, the court stated
Id. at 128.
Id. at 134.
124 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429, 429-31 (M.D.
Pa. 2010).
125 Id. at 432.
122
123

126
127

Id.
Id.

Id. at 433; see generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
Sikkelee, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 433-39 (citing General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552; Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, 72 Stat. 731; Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555; Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613
F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2010); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999);
Duvall v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:CV 05-1786, 2006 WL 1410794 (M.D. Pa. May 19,
2006)).
13o Id. at 439.
131 Id. at 434.
128
129

132

Id.
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that certain jurisdictions, "including the Third Circuit, have
held that the comprehensive and pervasive nature of federal
regulation evinces Congressional intent to impliedly preempt
the entire field of aviation."1"3
III.

JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL

In In re Air Crash near Clarence Center, New York, on Feb. 12,
2009, the district court considered a motion to remand by five
plaintiffs who originally filed their actions in New York state
court. 13 4 The defendants removed the cases, which arose out of
the Continental Connection Flight 3407 crash, to the federal
MDL court based on diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. " 5 According to the defendants, the plaintiffs fraudulently
joined Flight Safety, a New York corporation and a defendant in
the state court actions, for the purpose of defeating diversity.3 6
Moreover, the defendants argued that the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempted the
plaintiffs' state law claims.1 3 7 Thus, federal-question jurisdiction
provided an additional basis for removal.138 The district court
disagreed with the defendants and remanded the cases back to
state court.3 9 The court based its decision to remand on a finding that Flight Safety was not fraudulently joined and that preemption does not typically provide a basis for removal.1 40 As to
the fraudulent joinder of Flight Safety, the court reasoned the
defendants had not shown that there was no possibility of recovery or that New York's educational-malpractice bar applied to
Flight Safety. 141 Additionally, the preemption argument was not
persuasive, as the court found that preemption, here implied
not give rise to a
field preemption, is merely a defense that does
14 2
federal claim sufficient to support removal.
Id.
I34 In re Air Crash near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-md-2085,
2010 WL 5185106, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010).
135 Id.
136 Id. at *3.
17 Id. at *10.
138 See id.
139 Id. at *1, *12.
40 Id. at *4, *11.
141 Id. at *6. Flight Safety allegedly provided training to the flight crew, Rebecca Shaw, and Marvin Renslow. Id. at *1. There was a factual dispute regarding the level of direct involvement by Flight Safety. Id. at *8.
142 Id. at *9.
133
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In Scrogin v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the district court confronted
whether the defendants properly removed an injury case filed in
Connecticut state court arising out of the crash of an OH-58
Kiowa Warrior helicopter near Kirkuk, Iraq, during a night convoy security mission in an active war zone. 14 3 In response to the
plaintiffs' motion to remand, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs' claims presented substantial issues of federal law and,
therefore, removal was proper under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing 44 As an additional basis for removal, the defendants relied on the federal
officer-removal statute, citing to the fact that the aircraft and its
engines were produced for the military under government contracts and the defendants had at least two colorable federal defenses-the government-contractor defense and the combatantactivities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter of
which bars certain tort claims against military contractors arising
during a time of war.14
The district court agreed with the defendants' removal
grounds; namely, that the plaintiffs' claims presented substantial
issues of federal law such that removal was proper because the
case involved active-duty military officers, an accident that occurred during a military operation, and an allegedly defective
engine that was sold exclusively to the U.S. Army.' 4 6 Moreover,
the district court concluded that removal under the federal officer-removal statute was proper because the defendants were
acting under the close supervision of the government and the
conduct giving rise to the plaintiffs' claims was pursuant to that
direction. 14 7 As to the colorable federal-defense prong, a requirement under the federal officer-removal statute, the district
court found that a viable government-contractor defense existed
143 Scrogin v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 3:10cv442 (WWE), 2010 WL 3547706, at
*1 (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2010).
144 Id. at *2 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). The U.S. Supreme Court case Grable provides a removal framework, though narrowly construed, for cases that turn on the interpretation of federal law. Grable,545 U.S. at 314. The case is often cited as a basis for
removal when combined with federal standard of care preemption, issues regarding proper certification and delegation of related duties to manufactures under
DER or DOA authority, and other inherently federal issues that permeate aviation accident litigation.
145 Scrogin, 2010 WL 3547706, at *4-6; see Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2006).
146 See Scrogin, 2010 WL 3547706, at *4-6.
147 See id.
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because the defendants contended that they complied with reasonably precise specifications set forth by the government for
the design and manufacture of the engine. 4 8 Additionally, the
court concluded that the combatant-activities exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act may apply in light of the circumstances
of the accident occurring during a time of war. 4 9
Broussard v. LCS Correction Services, Inc. involved a wrongful
death case brought by the family of a Louisiana man who was
killed when a Beechcraft Baron crashed into his mobile home
near the Jeanerette Le Maire Memorial Airport.15 ° The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, their fourth such amendment,
which contained new allegations that the defendants' violations
of various federal-aviation regulations found in Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations caused the accident.151 The defendants timely removed the case to the Louisiana federal court,
claiming the case now presented a federal question, namely, the
defendants' alleged violations of the regulations set forth in Title 14.152
The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the framework
articulated in Grable did not support removal.15 The district
court agreed, finding "that 'the mere presence of a federal issue
in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federalquestion jurisdiction.'"154 The court relied on a body of case

law holding that an alleged violation of the federal-aviation regulations does not support removal.' 55 The district court reasoned that, although aviation cases may involve alleged
violations of federal-aviation regulations, resolving those federal
156
issues will not necessarily be dispositive of the entire case.
Moreover, the district court found that the case did not turn on
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
150 Broussard v. LCS Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 6:10-cv-0155, 2010 WL 2710642, at
*1 (W.D. La. July 6, 2010).
15, Id. at *1.
152 Id.
153 Id. at *1-2.
154 Id. at *2, *6 (quoting Merrell Dow v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986)).
155 Id. at *4-6 (citing Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007);
McCarty v. Precision Airmotive Corp., No. 8:06-cv-1391-T-26TBM, 2006 WL
2644921 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006); XL Specialty Co. v. Viii. of Schaumburg, No.
06 C 2299, 2006 WL 2054386 (N.D. Ill.July 20, 2006); Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design
Corp., No. 05-2137 (PAM/RLE), 2006 WL 399419 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2006);
Sarantino v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:05MD1702 JCH, 2005 WL 2406024 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 29, 2005)).
156 Id. at *6.
148

149
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a disputed interpretation of federal law as it did in Grable,
rather, the case was fact intensive and concerned whether the
facts alleged
amounted to a violation of the federal
157
regulations.

In West v. A & S Helicopters, the defendants removed a case
filed in Missouri state court based on Grable and the federal officer-removal statute. 158 The case involved the crash of a privately owned MD500, which killed one passenger and injured
another. 159 The plaintiffs moved to remand, and the defendants
asserted two principal arguments in support of removal. 160 First,
the defendants relied on Grable, claiming the plaintiffs' action
necessarily involved substantial issues of federal law, actually disputed, that required a uniform application of federal law by federal courts.'
Specifically, the defendants pointed to the
plaintiffs' allegation that they violated the federal-aviation regulations in connection with their duties as type-certificate holders
for the helicopter. 62 Additionally, the defendants argued that
the federal officer-removal statute was met, as the defendants'
employees were delegated certain responsibilities by the FAA regarding certification.1 63 The Grable arguments did not persuade
the court, which found that courts in similar cases rejected this
basis for removal. 164 As to the federal-officer ground for removal, the district court was unwilling to impute delegated actions to the defendants, which would allow them to avail
themselves of the federal officer-removal statute.1 65 The court
went on to find that FAA designees and their employers were
distinct legal entities for purposes of federal-officer removal.1 66
Thus, the defendants could not rely on federal-officer
removal
167
for the federally delegated acts of their employees.
In Koral v. Boeing Co., the Seventh Circuit considered whether
Boeing's removal of several cases filed in Illinois state court was
Id.
West v. A & S Helicopters, No. 2:10-CV-04181-NKL, 2010 WL 4703820, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2010).
157

158

159 Id.
160 Id.

Id. at
Id.
163 Id. at
64 Id. at
65 Id. at
166 Id.
167 Id. at
161

*3.

162

*4.
*3.
*5.
*6.
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proper under the Class Action Fairness Act.168 The cases, 29 in
total with 117 named plaintiffs, arose out of the 2009 crash of a
Boeing-built Turkish airliner in the Netherlands.169 Boeing
moved to dismiss the state court cases on the basis of forum non
conveniens, arguing, among other grounds, that Washington
was a more convenient forum, as its Washington-based employees-required witnesses for trial-would be burdened by attending twenty-nine separate trials in Illinios. 170 In response to
Boeing's motion, the plaintiffs argued that, as a practical matter,
there would likely be a single liability trial in an exemplar case,
thus obviating the need for Boeing's witnesses to make multiple
trips to Illinois for subsequent trials. 171 The court will, therein a single proceeding,
fore, establish liability, or lack thereof,
172
according to the plaintiffs' filing.
The Class Action Fairness Act provides for removal of a "'mass
action' . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more per-

sons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the
17
plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact.
Seizing on the plaintiffs' statement in response to the state court
forum non conveniens motion, Boeing removed, arguing that
the plaintiffs were proposing a mass-action trial as defined by
the Class Action Fairness Act.1 74 The various district courts to
which the removed cases were eventually assigned disagreed, remanding at least seven cases back to state court before the Seventh Circuit considered the issue.' 7 5 The Seventh Circuit held
that "Boeing's removal of the [I] cases was premature" because
the plaintiffs must clearly propose a joint trial themselves and
the statement contained in the opposition to the forum non
conveniens motion regarding a single liability trial was not a
proposal, but a prediction of what might happen if an Illinois
state court judge decided to hold a single liability trial. 176 The
168 Koral v. Boeing Co., 628 F.3d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 2011); see Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2006).
169Koral, 628 F.3d at 946.
170
171
172

Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
Koral, 628 F.3d at 946.
175 Id. Provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act provide for appellate review
of remand orders upon the granting of a petition for permission to appeal. 28
U.S.C. § 1453(c). The Seventh Circuit granted Boeing's petition on the basis
that the appeal presented novel issues. Kora4 628 F.3d at 946.
176 Koral, 628 F.3d at 946-47.
173 28

174

172
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Seventh Circuit thought it too harsh to displace the plaintiffs'
chosen forum for merely pointing out a practical consideration
of the Illinois state court regarding a possible liability trial in an
dismissal of their state court cases to
effort to avoid
17 7

Washington.

IV.

MILITARY CASES

Linfoot v. MD Helicopters, Inc. addressed the application of the
combatant-activities exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act to
claims against military contractors brought by a U.S. Army pilot
injured when his AH-6M Little Bird helicopter crashed south of
Baghdad following a main driveshaft failure.1 78 The accident occurred during an undefined mission, though the plaintiff was a
member of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(SOAR), a Special Forces regiment typically tasked with highrisk combat missions at night. 179 The defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the combatant-activities exception barred the plaintiffs state product liability claims
against military contractors because the injuries arose from combatant activities.18 0 Furthermore, the defendants claimed, the
"use of military equipment for combat purposes is a 'uniquely
federal interest' and that if military contractors could be sued
for injuries occurring during combat operations, such actions
would pose a significant conflict with the federal government's
interest in procuring military equipment and making combatrelated decisions."

18 1

The district court denied the defendants' motion without
prejudice, allowing further discovery to determine whether the
combatant-activities exception applied to the case. 182 The court
noted that the defense appeared to require a fact-based approach, much like the government-contractor defense.18 3 To
the extent the plaintiffs claims, when further developed, present a significant conflict with federal policy, the court may find
the exception applies, but on the current state of the factual
record, the court was not prepared to rule in the defendants'
Id. at 947.
Linfoot v. MD Helicopters, Inc., No. 3:09-0639, 2010 WL 4659482, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2010); see Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
179 Linfoot, 2010 WL 4659482, at *1.
180 Id. at *1, *3.
181 Id. at *3.
182 Id. at *9.
183Id. at *8.
177
178
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favor. "8' 4 Thus, it is likely that the issue will continue to be litigated in the Linfoot case as the parties conduct discovery and
prepare for trial.
In Getz v. Boeing Co., a case arising from the crash of an Army
MH-47E Chinook helicopter in Afghanistan, the plaintiffs sued
the manufacturers of the aircraft, its engines, and various components for design defects, manufacturing defects, and failure
to warn.1 8 5 The court held that the government-contractor defense applied to all defendants and, therefore, granted summary
judgment to each. 186 The court analyzed the government-con187
tractor defense's application to each defendant individually.
Outlining the legal standard as set out in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the court stated that a state law, which holds government contractors liable for design defects, must be displaced
"'when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise [design] specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
that were known
about the dangers in the use of the equipment
88
to the supplier but not the United States."1
The plaintiffs alleged that Honeywell, which manufactured
the aircraft's engines, had simply provided the U.S. Army with a
"stock" or "off-the-shelf' engine and, therefore, failed to satisfy
Boyle's first prong. 8 9 The court disagreed, stating that all the
evidence indicated that the U.S. Army had been heavily involved
throughout the engine design and qualification process, continuing through the testing and installation phases of development.' 90 The plaintiffs also claimed Honeywell failed to satisfy
the third prong because it failed to warn the U.S. Army about
the danger that water ingestion could cause engine failure.' 9 '
Again, the court disagreed, stating that because the U.S. Army
already knew of this danger, Honeywell was not required to pro92
vide such a warning.'
The plaintiffs claimed Goodrich was liable for design defects
related to the engines's "Full Authority Digital Electronic Con184

185
186

187

188
189
190

19,
192

Id.
Getz v. Boeing Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 995, 997, 999-1000.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 990 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988)).
Id. at 992.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 994-95.
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trol system (FADEC), which controls [an] engine's fuel flow and
includes the Digital Electronic Control Unit (DECU)." 93 The
plaintiffs specifically alleged that the U.S. "Army had absolutely
no involvement with the initial design of the FADEC," which
they claimed had been completed in the United Kingdom for
the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Chinook helicopters.' 94 The court
found that the components at issue, while similar to those used
by the RAF, were models specifically developed for and approved by the U.S. Army.19 5
Finally, the plaintiffs sought to hold Boeing liable for defects
in the design and manufacture of the aircraft itself.1 96 The
plaintiffs first alleged that the U.S. Army merely "rubberstamped" a pre-existing helicopter design, rather than defining
precise specifications for the aircraft. 197 Boeing refuted this argument by providing uncontroverted evidence that it worked
with the U.S. Army for many years to develop the MH-47 version
of the Chinook helicopter. 198 The plaintiffs claimed that, like
Honeywell, Boeing failed to warn the U.S. Army of dangers
known to it about the engines.19 9 However, "[b]ecause Boeing
manufactured the aircraft and not the engine, its only obligation under Boyle was to inform the Army of the hazards in the
use of the aircraft, not in the use of its engines."200
V. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
In Castillo v. Cessna Aircraft Co., defendant Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. moved for summary judgment in a product liability action arising from the crash of a Cessna aircraft equipped
with a Teledyne engine. 20

1

The aircraft took off from Peten,

Guatemala, en route to Guatemala City; at least two of the passengers onboard had been seriously injured in an automobile
accident and were being transported to Guatemala City for medical care. 2 Teledyne argued that GARA barred the plaintiffs'
claims.2 °3
193Id.

at 995.

194

Id.

195
196
197

Id. at 995-96.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.

198

Id.

9 Id. at 999.
200 Id.
201
202
203

Castillo v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id.
Id.
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The Florida district court, applying Florida choice of law
rules, applied the "most significant relationship" test and determined that Guatemalan law applied to the substantive issues of
the case. 20 4 The "most significant relationship" standard dictates "'that in tort actions involving more than one state, all substantive issues should be determined in accordance with the law
of the state having the most "significant relationship" to the occurrence and parties."'

20

5

Finding that a statute of repose is a

substantive rather than a procedural issue under Florida choice
of law principles, the court held that Guatemalan statutes of limitations and repose applied, and GARA, therefore, did not bar
the plaintiffs' claims.20 6
The court further noted that even if GARA were applicable to
the claims at bar, an issue of material fact existed relating to one
of the four GARA exceptions. 207 "GARA's statute of repose does
not apply 'if the person for whose injury or death the claim is
being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment
for a medical or other emergency.'-

20 8

It was undisputed that at

least two of the decedents were seriously injured and were being
taken to Guatemala City because of poor hospitals elsewhere.20 9
The plaintiffs argued that GARA's emergency exception applied; the defendant argued that the emergency exception applies only to passengers who receive emergency-medical
treatment while onboard the aircraft.2'0 The court stated that
under GARA's specific language, the "purpose" of the persons
who caused the injured passengers to board the aircraft is "critical. '' 1l Since the defendant failed to establish that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to why the injured passengers
were "made passengers" on the flight at issue, the court did not
grant summary judgment under GARA.212
In Aubrey v. PrecisionAirmotive LLC, two defendants, Lycoming
and Precision Airmotive, sought collateral review of a trial
court's denial of their motions for summary judgment under
Id.
Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
298, 108
204
205

at 1310-11.
(quoting Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1999)).
at 1311.
at 1312.
(quoting General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103Stat. 1552 § 2(b)(2)).

211

Id.
Id.
Id.

212

Id. at 1312-13.

209
210
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GARA.2 13 The plaintiffs alleged that in a case arising from the
2003 crash of a Piper aircraft manufactured in 1967, GARA's
statute of repose did not apply because the defendants' actions
fell within the statute's rolling provision. 2 14 The accident-aircraft's engine underwent an overhaul in 1989, "during which
new. compression rings were installed and the carburetor received a brass float system replacement. '2 15 The plaintiffs further alleged that GARA did not apply because the defendants
knowingly misrepresented to the FAA information material to
the performance of their component parts.2 1 6
I Lycoming asserted it did not manufacture the broken compression ring on the accident aircraft, and GARA's rolling provision was therefore inapplicable. 2 17 Because the plaintiffs
provided expert testimony and documentation establishing that
Lycoming may have manufactured, sold the compression ring,
or both, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact
existed, which needed to be decided at trial.2 18 Collateral review
was therefore inappropriate.2 1 9
Lycoming also argued that the trial court erred in its application of GARA's fraud exception by failing to require evidence of
intent or scienter. 22 ° The court stated that the plaintiffs provided evidence that Lycoming had notice of defects in its design,
which a jury must consider in deciding whether GARA's fraud
exception applies. 22 1 Ruling on the defendant's motion would,
therefore, require a fact-based review, which the court held was
inappropriate upon collateral review.2 2 2
. Like Lycoming, Precision Airmotive argued that it did not
manufacture the replacement part at issue. 223 But, in Precision's case, the court found that collateral review was appropriate because it questioned whether the trial court broadened the
scope of the term "manufacturer" under GARA by holding that
Precision would be treated as a manufacturer by virtue of its sta213 Aubrey v. Precision Airmotive LLC, 7 A.3d 256, 260, 262, 263 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2010).
214
215
216

Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 266.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
221 Id.
217

218
219
220

222
223

Id. at 263.
Id.
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tus as a PMA certificate holder. 224 The court held that "the term
'manufacturer,' in the context of the rolling provision, is limited
to the actual manufacturer of a replacement product, or one
who supplies the replacement product as its own. 225 The trial
court, therefore, "erred in denying summary judgment insofar
as it concluded that Precision could be deemed a 'manufac226
turer' . . . by virtue of its status as a PMA certificate holder.
In Stewart v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, Lycoming and Precision,

sought collateral review of a trial court's denial of their motions
for summary judgment under GARA. 227 The plaintiffs alleged

that in a case arising from the 2005 crash of a Piper aircraft
manufactured in 1964, GARA's statute of repose did not apply
because the defendants' actions fell within the statute's rolling
provision. 22 The accident-aircraft's engine underwent an over-

haul in 1991, during which the carburetor received a float-system replacement. 229 The plaintiffs further alleged that GARA
did not apply because the defendants knowingly misrepresented
to the FAA information material to the performance of their
component parts.23 °
The trial court denied both defendants' summary judgment
motions with respect to. the plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation. 23' The trial court held that "Lycoming was entitled to
GARA's protection under § 2(a) (2) ...because [Lycoming] did
not manufacture the replacementparts installed on the aircraft that
allegedly caused the accident. ' 232 As to the allegations of mis-

representation, however, the trial court found that questions of
fact remained as to whether Lycoming knowingly breached its
duty to inform the FAA of known defects that could adversely
affect an aircraft's airworthiness.23423 Collateral review, therefore,
was inapplicable to Lycoming.
Precision claimed that, although it was the PMA certificate
holder for the carburetor at issue and because it had not physically manufactured the carburetor on the accident aircraft, it
225

Id. at 264.
Id. (citing Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 437 (Pa. 2006)).

226

Id.

227

Stewart v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, 7 A.3d 266, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).

228
229

Id.
Id.

230
231
232
233

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

234

Id.

224

at
at
at
at

269-70.
270.
272 (internal quotations omitted).
274.
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was not a "manufacturer" within the meaning of GARA. 3 5 The
court disagreed, holding that the term "manufacturer" is not
uniform throughout GARA.236 While a defendant may not be
considered a "manufacturer" in terms of GARA's rolling provision, a PMA certificate holder qualifies as a manufacturer within
the meaning of the fraud exception because the exception "'expressly contemplates the duties and obligations arising out of
the type certificate,"' and the role of the PMA certificate holder
is inextricable from that of the type-certificate holder.23 v The
court stated, "unlike the right to repose afforded by GARA, an
airplane manufacturer's duty to report [defects] does not implicate the concerns recognized by Congress in passing GARA: 'the
impact of long-tail liability on a declining American aviation
industry.' "238
In Crouch v. Honeywell International,Inc., the court determined
that although an engine maintenance manual is not a "part" of
the engine, GARA entitles protection to an engine manufacturer producing such a manual. 23 9 The district court previously

denied the defendant engine manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, which defendant AVCO argued was warranted
under GARA.2 4 ° The case arose from a 2006 crash of a plane
equipped with an engine manufactured in 1978.241 The plain-

tiffs "argued that AVCO negligently wrote or revised [the] maintenance manual that a mechanic had used to overhaul the
engine in 2005;" AVCO revised the manual within the eighteen
years prior to the crash, which reset the clock on GARA's statute
of repose.242 The court originally declared that because the
manual was not an aircraft "part," AVCO was not entitled to
because GARA's statute
summary judgment on GARA grounds
3
24
of repose simply did not apply.

Upon AVCO's motion for reconsideration, the court reversed
itself.24 4 The court explained that FAA regulations require avia235

Id. at 275.

236

Id.

Id. (quoting Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 435-36 (Pa.
2006)).
238 Id. at 277.
239 Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-638-S, 2010 WL 4449222, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2010).
240 Id. at *1.
237

Id.
Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at *2.
241
242
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tion-engine manufacturers "to follow an extensive certification
process," including the production of "instructions to assist in
the continuing maintenance and overhaul of the engine" they
produce.245 "Thus, when AVCO[ ] . . . produced the engine, it
was also required to produce the overhaul manual.

'246

Because

a manufacturer's production of such manuals "is an essential element in the overall process of creating a product that satisfies
FAA regulations," AVCO was acting in its capacity as an engine
manufacturer when it produced the overhaul manual.2 4 7 Therefore, although the manual was not a "part" of the engine, "such
that its modification would restart the statute of repose,"
GARA's statute of repose applied to it, as well as to the engine
itself.248 The court granted AVCO summary judgment on GARA

grounds.249
In Rogers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the court determined
that GARA does not protect a helicopter manufacturer who produced a defective maintenance manual because such manuals

are not "part" of the helicopter. 211 In 2005, a Bell 47D-1 heli-

copter operated since 1951 crashed, injuring the plaintiff; the
helicopter had a maintenance manual issued in 1969.251 The
plaintiffs case was based on the allegation that the maintenance
manual was defective in that it provided improper instructions
for balancing the aircraft's tail-rotor blades.252 The trial court
granted Bell's motion in limine to exclude evidence that the
manual was defective, ruling that the manual was part of the
helicopter and, therefore, subject to GARA's statute of
repose.255
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a maintenance
manual is not part of the helicopter and that GARA is inapplicable. 254 The court explained that there are three different "triggers" for GARA's eighteen-year limitations period:
[(1) ] for any part that was "originally in" the aircraft, the limitations period runs from the date the aircraft was delivered ...
245

Id. at *1.

Id.
Id. at *2.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Rogers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 1 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010).
251 Id.
246
247

252

Id. at 2.

253

Id.

254

Id. at 2, 6.
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[(2)] for any part that was "added to" the aircraft, the limitations
period runs from "the date of completion of the addition [;]" and
[(3)] for any part that "replaced another part" of the aircraft...,
the limitations period runs from "the date of completion of the

replacement. "255
None of these triggers apply to the production of a maintenance manual.2 5 6 GARA's provisions tie to the idea of delivery
of an aircraft with its original component parts, which would
have included the accident aircraft's flight manual, but not a
maintenance manual.2 5 7
While federal regulation in force in 1951 required a flight
manual be furnished with each helicopter,2 58 there was no analogous provision for a maintenance manual. 259 The court explained that a later regulation requiring that a maintenance
manual be provided to the aircraft's owner upon the aircraft's
delivery was inapplicable because that regulation specifically
states that it applies to aircraft for which type-certificate application was made after January 28, 1981.260
The court in Fletcher v. Cessna Aircraft Co. held that GARA does
not bar claims against a defendant arising out of conduct unrelated to aircraft manufacturing. 26 ' The Fletcher court, therefore,
considered whether a failure to warn claim, brought over thirty
years after Cessna delivered the aircraft to its original purchaser,
2 62
was against Cessna "in its capacity as a manufacturer.
A Cessna aircraft manufactured and delivered in 1975 crashed
in 2005, and the plaintiff claimed Cessna failed to warn its owners of the effects of ice in the aircraft's fuel system. 26" The plaintiff argued "that a manufacturer acts in its capacity as such only
while manufacturing the aircraft or part. ' 264 Therefore, the action for failure to warn about proper servicing and use of an
aircraft is not an action against Cessna "'in its capacity as a man255
256
257

Id. at 3.
See id.
Id.

14 C.F.R. § 27.1581(a) (2010).
Rogers, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 5-6.
260 Rogers, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 4; see 14 C.F.R. § 21.50(b).
26, Fletcher v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 991 A.2d 859, 861 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010); see General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108
Stat. 1552, § 2(a).
262 Fletcher, 991 A.2d at 861.
258

259

263

264

Id.
Id. at 862.
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as 'servicing' or
ufacturer' but in a capacity better characterized
265
'publishing instructional materials.' ,,

The court stated that GARA's legislative history indicates Congress's purpose to afford broad protection to manufacturers,
with narrowly crafted exceptions.266 One such exception applies
when a manufacturer knowingly misrepresents to the FAA, or
conceals from the FAA, required information material to the
performance or maintenance of an aircraft. 26

"Unless Congress

viewed claims based upon disclosure or failure to disclose such
information as conduct undertaken by a manufacturer 'in its capacity as a manufacturer,' there would be no need for the exemption .... ",268 "[T] he fact that Congress crafted an exception
for certain egregious failures to disclose information to the FAA
suggests that Congress did not intend to preserve other claims
based on failures to disclose[,] advise," or warn. 269 The court
held that the plaintiffs claim was brought against Cessna "in its
capacity as a manufacturer," and the court upheld Cessna's
GARA defense.27 °
In Johnson v. AVCO Corp., the plaintiffs alleged that a defectively designed engine, manufactured and delivered in 1975,
caused an airplane crash in 2005.271 In considering the defen-

dant manufacturers' motion for summary judgment, the court
stated that GARA applied to the case because it was a "civil action for damages for death or injury to persons arising out of an
accident involving a general aviation aircraft" and because the
injuries sustained occurred
less than eighteen years after the air27 2
craft's initial delivery.

The court denied the summary judgment motion, however,
because the plaintiffs showed sufficient evidence that (1) the aircraft's engine was defectively designed, and (2) the defendants
supplied the engine parts at issue, which they installed in 2001,
well within the 18-year statute of repose.273 Because GARA's
265

Id.

266

Id. at

864.

See id. at 862-63.
268 Id. at 863.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 865.
271 Johnson v. AVCO Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
272 Id. at 1116 (internal quotations omitted); see General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, § 2(a).
273 Johnson, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
267
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clock restarted in 2001, GARA did not bar the plaintiffs'
claims.274
In South Side Trust & Savings Bank v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., the Illinois appellate court considered how GARA applied to four separate defendants in a case arising out of a 2001
crash of an aircraft delivered in 1970 that had its fuel-control
units (FCU) and propeller governors reconditioned and reinstalled in 1988 and was certified as meeting the FAA's airworthiness requirements in 1999.275
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant
Woodward, which reconditioned and reinstalled the FCU and
propeller governors because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that those parts caused the accident. 276 The appellate court reversed, holding that GARA did not compel
summaryjudgment. 277 Once Woodward asserted the affirmative
defense of GARA's statute of repose, "it was [the] plaintiffs burden to show facts [either] tolling or creating an exception to
GARA. ' 27 8 In order to toll the statute, the plaintiff had to show
evidence that (1) Woodward installed new parts on the aircraft
and (2) those parts caused the alleged damages. 279 The plaintiff
presented evidence to support both of these elements, and, at
the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove
causation. °
Defendant Honeywell manufactured the engine installed in
the airplane in 1980, but the plaintiff asserted that GARA did
not apply because Honeywell issued a revised engine-maintenance manual in 1994, which restarted GARA's clock. 28 '

The

plaintiff argued that a maintenance manual is a "new component" under GARA § 2(a) (2).282 The court recognized "that a
flight manual [is] considered a 'part' of a general-aviation aircraft" under GARA because it is an integral part of every general-aviation aircraft, federal regulation requires it to be
onboard every aircraft, and it contains instructions necessary to
274

Id.

S. Side Trust & Savs. Bank v.. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 927 N.E. 2d 179,
184-85 (111. App. Ct. 2010).
276 Id. at 185-86.
277 Id. at 195.
275

278
279

Id.
Id.

281

Id.
Id. at 196.

282

Id.

280
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operate the aircraft.28 3 A maintenance manual, however, does
not fit within GARA's scope as it is not necessary to operate an
airplane and no regulation requires it to be onboard during
flight.284 Because the maintenance manual was not a "part" of
the airplane, a revision to the manual did not toll GARA's statand the court upheld Honeywell's summary
ute of repose,
2 5
judgment.
The lower court granted summary judgment under GARA to
Mitsubishi, the Japanese company that manufactured the airplane, because the crash occurred more than eighteen years after the original purchaser received the plane.28 6 On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that GARA's legislative history shows congressional intent to limit the statute's protection to American manufacturers. 28 7 The plain language of the statute, however, "refers
only to a 'manufacturer' of 'general aviation aircraft;"' it does
not limit GARA's benefits only to American manufacturers.28 8
Furthermore, GARA covers "'any aircraft' awarded a type certificate or certificate of airworthiness by the FAA. '28 9 The trial
court, therefore, did not err in finding that GARA applies to a
foreign manufacturer.2 9 °
Finally, the court considered whether defendant Mitsubishi
Industries America (MIA) was the successor manufacturer to
Mitsubishi and, therefore, protected by GARA, despite the fact
that MIA does not manufacture anything. 291 In the past, courts
held that the holder of an aircraft's type certificate or PMA has
an affirmative duty to report to the FAA any problems with the
29 2
aircraft and to issue instructions for continued airworthiness.
On the basis of these duties, GARA considers the holder to be
the aircraft's "manufacturer. '293 Mitsubishi, pursuant to a licensing agreement, delegated performance of those duties to
MIA. 29 4 The court found that MIA's assumption and performance of those duties qualifies it as a "manufacturer" under
283

Id.

284
286

Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.

287

Id.

288

Id. at 199.

285

Id.
Id.
291 Id. at 203.
2 Id. at 203-04.
289

29

-3

Id. at 204.

294 Id.
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GARA, and it upheld the trial court's grant of summary
295

judgment.

In AVCO Corp. v. Neff a Florida appellate court considered
whether to accept an interlocutory appeal from the defendants
whose motion for summary judgment, based on GARA, the trial
court denied.296 Ultimately, the court refused to allow the appeal, holding that GARA does not provide manufacturers with
297
immunity from

suit.

The case involved an aircraft that crashed twenty-three years
after it was manufactured.298 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that GARA barred the claims against
them.299 The trial court denied the motion because genuine
questions of fact existed. 0 The defendants' argument on appeal was that the purpose of GARA was to shield manufacturers
from costly litigation, which is precisely the harm they would
suffer if the appellate court did not intervene and grant sum0
mary judgment."
The appellate court, therefore, had to determine whether a
manufacturer's protection under GARA is a right to immunity
from suit or merely a defense to liability.10 2 The court held that
GARA's statute of repose is more analogous to a statute of limitations that operates as an affirmative defense than absolute immunity from suit.3 0 3 The court stated, "[t]he repose period is

not absolute;" GARA's legislative history indicates "that the statute was enacted to protect manufacturers from the 'infinite liability-tail' of product liability suits rather than to protect them
from the burdens of discovery and trial." ' 4
VI.

DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT

In re Air CrashDisasteroff the Coast of Nantucket Island,Massachusetts on Oct. 31, 1999 is a case arising from a 1999 crash of an
airliner into the Atlantic Ocean approximately sixty miles from
-5

Id. at 203, 206.

296 AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 3d 597, 600-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
-7

Id. at 604.

298 Id. at 599-600.
'-

Id. at 600.

3- Id.

at 601.

Id. at 601-02.
302 Id. at 602.
503 Id. at 604.
301

-

Id.
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Nantucket Island. °5 The defendants moved to dismiss under
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA),6 arguing the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.3 17 Under DOHSA, only a court-appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate may
bring a suit for wrongful death.3 0° This personal representative
must initiate such an action within DOHSA's three-year statute
of limitations, which accrues at the time of death.30 9 The limitations period will only be tolled if the plaintiff can demonstrate a
strong justification for the delay. 10
The plaintiff originally filed his complaint in 2001, soon after
his parents' death, but he did not become the representative of
their estate until 2009, nearly ten years after the crash and seven
years after the limitations period expired.3 1 1 Because the process of appointing the plaintiff representative of his parents' estate was not completed within the limitations period, the court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the
plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.31
The court in Gund v. PilatusAircraft, Ltd. confirmed the longstanding rule that DOHSA allows for recovery of pecuniary
losses in cases "'occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical

miles from the shore of the United States. '"313 The court further noted that the statute allows for nonpecuniary damages for
commercial aviation accident[s] occurring on the high seas be31 4
yond 12 nautical miles from the shore of the United States.'
Gund involved a crash three miles off the coast of Costa Rica
resulting in six deaths. 1 5 The court held that DOHSA applied
because "'something that happens within the territorial waters
of a foreign state occurs on the "high seas" for purposes of

DOHSA.'

"316

305 In reAir Crash Disaster off the Coast of Nantucket Island, Mass. on Oct. 31,
1999, No. MD-00-1344 (BMC), 2010 WL 1221401, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
306 Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006).
307 In re Air Crash Disaster off the Coast of Nantucket, 2010 WL 1221401, at *4.
308 Id. at *5.
309 Id. at *5; 46 U.S.C. § 30106.
310 In re Air Crash Disaster off the Coast of Nantucket, 2010 WL 1221401, at *5.

31,

Id.

Id. at *4-5.
Gund v. Pilatus Aircraft, Ltd., No. C07-4902TEH, 2010 WL 887376, at *2, *6
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30302).
314 Id. at *2 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30307).
315 Id. at *1, *3.
316 Id. at *3 (quoting Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc., 41 F.3d 527, 529, 530 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
312

313
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The defendant argued that, because the flight was a "privatesightseeing flight," rather than one involving a "transport category aircraft with fare-paying passengers," the accident was not a
"commercial aviation accident," and only pecuniary damages
should be available to the plaintiffs.3" The court disagreed,
holding that because the passengers paid for the flight and that
the passengers and pilot did not share a bona fide common purpose, the crash at issue constituted a "commercial aviation accident" under DOHSA.3 11 "Both pecuniary and nonpecuniary

damages [were] therefore available ....
The plaintiffs also argued that nonpecuniary damages were
available because Costa Rican law, which they demanded should
govern the case, allowed for moral damages.32 ° In determining
the choice of law, the court applied the Lauritzen v. Larsen factors: "(1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag;
(3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured party; (4) the allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) the place of contract;
(6) the inaccessibility of the foreign forum; and (7) the law of
the forum."31 2 ' Applying these factors, the court held that only

the first factor clearly favored Costa Rican law.322 Because the
interests of the United States were "sufficiently 32 implicated,"
3
Costa Rican law was not available to the plaintiffs.

PROPERTY DAMAGE AND BUSINESS-LOSS CASES

VII.

In Kalitta Air, LLC v. United Air Lines, Inc., the subrogated insurers of Kalitta sought to recover damages from United Airlines
arising out of an October 2004 engine-separation incident involving a Kalitta Boeing 747 cargo aircraft. 24 One of the 747's
JT9D engines separated from the aircraft after take-off from Chicago O'Hare and plunged into Lake Michigan.3

25

The NTSB

determined that improper repair work to the engine performed
in 1996 by United Airlines for Polar Air Cargo caused the accident.3

26

Polar Air Cargo removed the engine from service and

319

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *6.
Id.

320

Id.

321
322

Id. at *7; see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-92 (1953).
Gund, 2010 WL 887376, at *8.

323

Id.

317
318

Kalitta Air, LLC v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 07-14454, 2011 WL 8146, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2011).
324

325

Id.

326

Id.
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placed it in storage from 1998 until 2003, when Kalitta subsequently purchased the engine and installed it on one of its
aircraft. 27
United moved for summary judgment on the ground that it
owed no duty of care to Kalitta, the subsequent purchaser of the
engine; its only duties were owed to Polar Air Cargo as United's
contractual customer for the repair work.3 28 The district court
disagreed, relying on the Second Restatement of Torts § 324A,
which provides that a party acting under contract may not exculpate itself from liability to third persons such as Kalitta. 329 Addi-

tionally, the court found that United's act of certifying the
engine as airworthy by issuing FAA Form 337 created an affirmative duty to the public, not just Kalitta, which United possibly
breached by performing the improper engine work. 33 ' Accorddistrict court denied United's motion for summary
ingly, the 331
judgment.
In Britton v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., the district court reviewed
the report of the magistrate judge recommending the denial of
the defendants' summary judgment motion regarding lost profits as precluded by Idaho law. 3 32 The case involved the 2003

crash of an Aerospatiale AS450D helicopter operated by the
plaintiff Silverhawk Aviation, an aerial firefighting outfit.33

3

The

helicopter suffered an engine failure and crashed, causing the
helicopter to be damaged beyond repair. 4 Silverhawk Aviation
sought to recover its damages for the hull loss and its lost profits
as a result of the helicopter being out of service. 35 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Idaho law precluded recovery of any damages other than the value of the
helicopter and, therefore, lost profits were unrecoverable.3

36

In

adopting the finding of the magistrate judge and denying the
defendants' motion, the district court found that under Idaho
law, economic loss is recoverable in tort when the loss is para-

328

Id.
Id. at *2.

3-

Id. at *3 (citing

327

33- Kalitta, 2011
331

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 324A cmt. a (1997)).

WL 8146, at *5.

Id. at *7.

Britton v. Dall. Airmotive, Inc., No. CV07-547-S-EJL, 2010 WL 797177, at *1
(D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2010).
333 Id.
332

334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
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sitic to an injury to person or property. 33 7 Accordingly, the al-

leged loss of profits caused by the total destruction of the
helicopter and its unavailability for use in the plaintiffs business
was parasitic to the property damage to the helicopter, and the
plaintiff could recover such economic losses under Idaho law.338
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. v. American Airlines, Inc. is a property
damage suit arising from the September 11, 2001, attacks in
which Cantor Fitzgerald (Cantor) lost its principal office in the
World Trade Center and 658 of the approximately 1,000 officers
and employees who worked there.3 39 In a lawsuit in which Cantor sued American for negligently failing to prevent the hijacking of American Flight 11, American moved for partial
summary judgment to limit the scope of Cantor's claimed
damages.34 °
In estimating its damages, Cantor used a "holistic" approach.3 4 1 Its damages expert stated that "when the airplane

crashed into the building it destroyed-killed people, it destroyed
office space, it destroyed the books of business, it destroyed the
342
relationships. I quantified the damages related to all of that.

Using this approach, Cantor claimed losses of almost $1
billion.343
American argued that Cantor's business interruption claim
was "based substantially on the consequences of the deaths of its
employees, in contravention of New York law. ' 34 4 The court
agreed that the major part of Cantor's loss resulted from having
lost the services of its deceased employees. 3 45 It granted American's motion and required Cantor to restate its damages
estimate.346
New York law allows an individual whose business is harmed
to sue for damages to compensate for lost profits. 347 But, "[t] he
337 Id. at 2. The Idaho Supreme Court in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n,
895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995) announced the Idaho rule regarding economic loss
relied on by the court.
338 Britton, 2010 WL 797177, at *2.
339 Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7318, 2011 WL
149518, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011).
34 Id. at *1-2.
341 Id. at *5.
342 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
343

Id.

3-

Id. at *7.

345

Id.

346

Id. at *11-12.

347

Id. at *7.
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189

cause of action for lost profits must arise from physical damage
to property; it cannot be maintained if a plaintiff alleges only
economic damages. '"348 To allow Cantor to claim lost profits
arising from the deaths of its employees would be to recognize
master/servant liability, which posits that an employer has a proprietary interest in his employees' services. 49 New York law
does not permit a plaintiff employer to sue for acts that interfere
with the employer's ability to enjoy the employee's labor.3" ° The
court declared that New York law does not permit Cantor's hoit, therefore, limited the scope of Cantor's
listic approach, and
3 51
available damages.
VIII.

EVIDENCE AND EXPERTS

In Godfrey v. Precision Airmotive Corp., the District Court of Appeal of Florida addressed, among other issues, the standard for
admitting evidence of other accidents.3 5 2 The Godfrey case arose
out of a Cessna 150 crash alleged to have been caused by a defective carburetor.3 5 3 The plaintiffs sued three defendants; Precision Airmotive settled, while Teledyne suffered adverse
verdicts, including an award of punitive damages.3 54 The trial
court granted Teledyne's motion for new trial, and the plaintiffs
appealed.3 5 5 On Teledyne's cross-appeal, it raised a point of error regarding the trial court's admission of evidence, over
Teledyne's objection, of more than 100 other incidents without
proper foundation to establish that substantially similar defects
to those alleged by the plaintiff caused the events. 5 6
In its opinion, the Florida District Court of Appeal reviewed
the standard for admission of such evidence established by the
Florida Supreme Court, which requires that other accident evidence involve the same type of equipment under substantially
similar conditions and that the evidence establish the accident
or incident is substantially similar.3 57 In reviewing the trial record, the Florida Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiffs
348 Id.

349

at *8.

Id. at *9.

350

Id.

351

Id. at *11.

Godfrey v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 46 So. 3d 1020, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (per curiam).
353 Id. at 1022.
354 Id. at 1023 (Sawaya, J., dissenting).
355 Id. at 1021 (majority opinion).
352

356

357

Id. at 1021-22.
Id. at 1022.
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failed to establish similarity in the products or the circumstances
involved in the other incidents and accidents.

58

For example,

several incidents involved different engines, including engines
not manufactured by Teledyne, and furthermore, the engines
were not always equipped with the same model carburetor. 59
The court, thus, remanded the case to the trial court for a new
trial as to Teledyne only; Precision Airmotive apparently settled
with the plaintiffs while the case was on appeal.360
In Stephenson v. Honeywell International,Inc., the district court
considered, among other issues, whether to exclude the plaintiffs' expert's opinions based on a non-testifying consultant's
flight-path analysis. 361 The defendant argued that the plaintiffs'

expert "should not be permitted merely to parrot another expert's opinions. 362 The district court declined to exclude the
flight-path analysis on the basis that the consultant was acting at
the direction of the plaintiffs' testifying expert, and there is no
rule prohibiting an expert's use of a collaborating consultant if
the ultimate opinions are those of the testifying expert qualified
to give the opinion.363 The defendant did not challenge the testifying expert's qualifications, and, therefore, the court declined
to exclude the opinion in question, further noting that the defendant was free to inquire of the testifying expert during deposition regarding the analysis and conclusions supported by the
3 64
consultant's work.

In In re Air Crash near Clarence Center, New York, on Feb. 12,
2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of the
plane's cockpit voice recorder (CVR), claiming that "the written
transcript of the recording [was] incomplete and inaccurate. "365
The plaintiffs argued that "evidence relevant to the [passengers'] pre-impact terror, conscious pain and suffering, the pilots' attentiveness, the atmosphere in the cockpit, and
situation[al] awareness,"6 could only be discerned from the ac3

tual audio recording.
358
359

3-

6

Id.
Id. at 1022-23.
Id. at 1023.

Stephenson v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 (D. Kan.
2010).
6 2 Id. at 1255.
361

363
3-

Id.
Id. at 1255-56.

365 In reAir Crash near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-md-2085,
2010 WL 4116790, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010).

366

Id.
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The court applied the legal standard defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1154.67 To wit, discovery of a recording is authorized if, after
an in camera review, the court decides that (1) the available
transcript does not provide the moving party with sufficient information for that party to receive a fair trial, and (2) discovery
of the recording is necessary for the moving party to receive a
fair trial.3

68

Discovery of a non-public recording can occur only

under the terms of a protective order that, in the least, (1) limits
use of the recording to the judicial proceeding, and (2) prohibits dissemination of the recording to any person that does not
need access to it for the proceeding. 69
After reviewing the recording in camera, the court declared
that the plaintiffs met their burden since the written transcript
did not reflect the tone of voice, pitch, volume, or inflection;
nor did it accurately reflect other ambient noises pertinent to
the aircraft's operation.17 0 Because these attributes of the re-

cording were relevant to the plaintiffs' claim and stating that a
CVR "is often the only piece of neutral evidence in an air crash
case," the court held that discovery of the CVR was necessary to
ensure a fair trial. 71 In accordance with § 1154(a) (4) (A), the
court entered a protective order to allay the defendants' concerns for the privacy rights of the crew and their families. 72
IX.

PLEADING ISSUES

In American Guaranteeand Liability Insurance Co. v. CirrusDesign
Corp., the subrogated property insurers of residents and businesses of an Eastside Manhattan condominium building sought
to recover damages from Cirrus Design for insurance benefits
paid after an SR-20 crashed into the building. 3 73

Insurers

claimed that the SR-20 had known control-system problems,
which the plaintiffs alleged caused the aircraft to lose control
while making a left turn over the East River.374 The complaint
alleged "'certain defects"' in the steering controls that made the
aircraft uncontrollable and that Cirrus knew of these defects at
367 Id.

368 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(3) (2006).

369 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (4) (A).
370 In re Air Crash near Clarence Ctr., 2010 WL 4116790, at *2.
371 Id. at *2-3.
372 Id. at *4.
373 Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 09 Cv. 8357, 2010
WL 5480775, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010).
374 Id.
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the time of the crash.3 7 5 The insurers did not specify the actual
defective component or the nature of the defect.3 7 6 Cirrus

moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim, arguing that the
unspecified defect could encompass any one of the many component parts of the systems designed to operate the rudder and
ailerons of the aircraft.3

7

The district court agreed with Cirrus,

reasoning that the insurers' complaint failed to meet the pleading standards developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.3 71 The court granted
the motion to dismiss, though the court granted the insurers
leave to amend.3 7 9 The district court noted that it refused to

grant summary judgment in Cory Lidle's case, the related
wrongful death action against Cirrus for the death of the New
York Yankee's pitcher onboard the aircraft with his flight instructor, Tyler Stanger. 380
X.

CHOICE OF LAW

The choice of law decision in Iskowitz v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
came from a series of consolidated actions arising from the 2005
Pueblo, Colorado, crash of a Cessna 560.381 The plaintiffs' decedents and heirs resided in either Virginia or Illinois; other defendants (Martinair, and Circuit City Stores, which, respectively,
provided the crew and owned the aircraft) were Virginia residents.382 The United States was also a defendant in some of
the actions. 83
Cessna filed a motion for determination of state law, contending that to the extent state law applied, the law of Cessna's prinId. at *2.
Id.
377 Id.
378 Id. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal are two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing the pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6). SeeAshcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Under this formulation, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Moreover, legal conclusions
"must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 1950.
379 Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 5480775, at *4.
380 Id.
2010 WL
381 Iskowitz v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 07-cv-00968-REB-CBS,
3075476, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2010).
382 Id. at *9-10.
383 Id. at *1.
375

376
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cipal place of business-Kansas-should govern as to liability
and damages issues.3 84 Martinair and Circuit City also filed a
choice of law motion, advocating for Colorado law. 85
The district court held that there was an "outcome-determinative" conflict on the issue of statutory non-economic damages
caps among the laws of the four states that could potentially apply. 386 Two of the states (Colorado and Kansas) capped such

damages, but differed as to the amount of the cap; the other
states (Virginia and Illinois) did not cap such damages.3 8 7 After

conducting a Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws analysis,
noting that the place of injury was "fortuitous" in this aviationaccident setting, the court held that the most important factor
on the damages-cap issue was the location of Cessna's conduct,
which allegedly caused injury to the plaintiffs. 88 Since that location was Kansas, Kansas law applied to claims against Cessna. 89
The district court also held on the Martinair/Circuit City motion regarding the issue of allocation of fault among the defendants that comparative fault rather than joint and several liability
would apply.39 ° Again, there was a conflict in laws, as two states
(Colorado and Kansas) utilized comparative fault principles,
while two others (Virginia and Illinois) applied joint and several
liability (with some exceptions in the case of Illinois) .391 The
court noted that considerations of uniformity of approach dictated that either one or the other system of allocation must apply to all claims against all defendants. 9 2 The court again
focused on the location of the defendants' conduct, noting that
the wrongful conduct of Martinair and Circuit City occurred in
Colorado, as the location of the accident.39 3 The court39 4ruled
that Colorado comparative-fault principles should apply.
384 Id.

388

Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *7.

389

Id.

385
386
387

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *8.
392 Id. at *11.
393 Id. at *9-11.
394 Id. at *11. Special thanks to Marilyn S. Chappell of Wells, Anderson & Race
in Denver for assistance with the analysis of the Iskowitz decision. Ms. Chappell,
along with Mary A. Wells, represented Cessna Aircraft Co. in the district court.
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